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What role do corporations have in global governance? Christopher May writes that while
corporations are often viewed as either the subjects of global governance, or actors that have a
particular inﬂuence (positive or negative) over setting political agendas, within their extended
international supply chains corporations have a signiﬁcant governance role which is worthy of study
in its own right. 
Often in the discussion of global governance, if corporations are included they are seen as either
subject to various international organisations’ regulatory impact/oversight or are identiﬁed as having
(benign or malign) inﬂuence over agenda setting in the issue areas in which they operate. However, it is less often
recognised that within their extended international supply chains, global corporations and/or internationalised ﬁrms
play a signiﬁcant governance role themselves.
If, as is commonly asserted, one third of world trade is between corporations, and a further third is within global
supply chains (intra-ﬁrm trade) then the majority of trade activity in the international realm is in some way or another
overseen by corporations. This is a signiﬁcant arena for political economic interactions, subject to inter-agent
asymmetries, normative shaping, structural power and the construction of legitimated authority.
The extended and complex supply chains that are utilised by many ﬁrms and corporations bring together a wide and
varied group of subsidiaries, associated and independent suppliers, and require signiﬁcant levels of governance to
maintain the ﬂow of products (and services) for the core organising corporation. This ranges from the governance of
property rights (tangible and intangible) and technological development and deployment, to questions of labour
relations and the impact on the environment of contractors’ activity. Much discussion of (global) supply chains
focusses on their ‘eﬃcient’ management, but seldom explores the explicit and implicit power relations that
corporations’ governance function is based upon.
However, the highly developed and necessary internal processes and practices of control and cross-ownership that
make up any corporations’ governance of its supply chain, by virtue of the global reach of such networks, represent
a signiﬁcant parallel to the range of issues that are more usually identiﬁed as of importance in the analysis of global
governance, including principal/agency issues as well as the management of compliance, and the setting of
agendas of action and establishing legitimacy of practice. Therefore, our understanding both of global governance
and the political economy of the global corporate sector can be enhanced by regarding global corporations as
additional institutions of global governance.
Popular demands that corporations act responsibly under the rubric of corporate social responsibility (CSR) already
recognise that corporations are governance institutions able to eﬀect shifts and changes in practices (albeit
imperfectly) within their networks of exchange. Previously, concerns around global governance have focused on
how global corporations have interacted with regimes of CSR including but not limited to the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Corporations and the United Nations Global Compact. However, the ability to enact the requirements of
such agreements and principles involves corporations in a series of governance arrangements that are by no means
dissimilar to the forms found in the ‘public’ realm of global governance even if the agents and practices are not
exactly the same.
Therefore, in parallel to work that recognises the growing pluralism in international law, it makes sense to also posit
a pluralism of institutional form and authority in contemporary global governance. Understanding global
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corporations’ control of these supply chains as a form of global governance immediately opens up this realm to
analytical tools already developed to examine more normally conceived forms of global governance, while also
oﬀering a complementary analysis showing how global governance may be experienced across the global system.
Perhaps the most important element that this analysis can draw from the study of public institutions of global
governance relates to the establishment and maintenance of legitimacy; for corporations any resources required to
‘force’ compliance with contractual terms and conditions can be costly, and thus the ability to construct such
demands as party of a legitimate authority can pay oﬀ both in eﬃciency terms (as other analysis might capture) but
also in terms of overall organisational eﬀectiveness.
Moreover, this approach allows analysis to understand the negotiation (and power relations therein) where
corporations are dealing with contractors who are not exclusively working with their network; exit, voice and loyalty
issues become key to maintaining the network’s ability to keep production ﬂowing through the chain. This has led to
solutions to supply chain governance that look much more like empowerment and socialisation than the operation of
basic spot-market contracting.
The argument that this is a useful approach to the study of global corporate networks is not a claim that all
corporations or ﬁrms are equally able to govern their networks to the same degree or level of eﬀectiveness. As with
any other globally focused organisations, we are likely to ﬁnd some corporations achieve a level of eﬀective
governance as good as, or even beyond that which the most eﬀective global regimes can claim; equally we will ﬁnd
others that choose or are eﬀectively unable to establish strong governance functionality in the same way that we
can identify weak or partly ineﬀective public global governance institutions.
Nevertheless, recognising corporations as institutions of global governance encourages an analysis of the operation
of power (in its various dimensions) within an important realm of the global system which remains obscured when
accounts focus only on states and intergovernmental organisations. Crucially, this approach recognises that while
speciﬁc corporate supply-chain constellations may be often rationalised as serving the goal of eﬃciency, they are
actually the result of a continuing process of power relations, eﬀective governance and the construction of
legitimacy.
Research that has foregrounded private authority in the global system has gone some way in this direction, but the
internal political economy of the corporate supply chain has not been extensively examined by these analysts. Thus,
political economists might usefully move beyond this relative inattention to examine the realm of the supply chain as
an interesting site of global governance in itself to reveal how global corporations shape their own political economic
space. One way to respond to the often heard assertion that ‘corporations rule the world’ is to examine the global
governance of the corporate supply chain to both oﬀer evidence of where that rule does seem pervasive, but also to
explore the limitations of such claims for corporate power’s inﬂuence across the global system.
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